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LIABILITY OF MEDIA COMPANIES FOR
THE VIOLENT CONTENT OF THEIR
PRODUCTS MARKETED TO CHILDREN
JONATHAN M. PROMANt

INTRODUCTION

Children in the United States are frequently exposed to
media violence, defined for the purposes of this Note as
communication depicting physical force used to injure person or
property.1 Courts have refused to hold media corporations liable
for the violent content of child-entertainment products, 2 but
t J.D. Candidate, June 2004, St. John's University School of Law; B.S., 1997,
Cornell University; M.Sc., 2000, Trinity College, University of Dublin.
1 See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,
804 (1996) (stating that all forms of "'broadcasting [including offensive
programming,] is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read.'"
(quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978))); Am. Amusement Mach.
Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577-79 (7th Cir. 2001) (examining an array of
violent video games, many of which were marketed exclusively to children, and their
effects on child consumers); Rupal Ruparel Dalal, Congress Shall Make No Law
Abridging Freedom of Speech-Even if It Causes Our Children to Kill?, 25 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 357, 362-63 (2001) (describing the many types of violent media
products targeted to children); Anna Everett, P.C. Youth Violence: "What's the
Internet or Video Gaming Got To Do With It?," 77 DENV. U. L. REV 689, 697 (2000)
(commenting on "ubiquitous television violence"); J. Robert Linneman, Note,
Davidson v. Time Warner: Freedom of Speech... But Watch What you Say! The
Question of Civil Liability for Negligence in the Mass Media, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 163,
163 (2000) (discussing "[tlhe prevalence of violence in film, television, music, games
and other forms of entertainment" marketed to children); John Leland, Violence,
Reel to Real, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 11, 1995, at 46-48 (examining the plethora of violent
media products in America and their effects on viewers, including children). Despite
numerous media violence suits and related scientific and popular literature, there is
no generally accepted definition of "media violence."
2 See Watters v. TSR, Inc., 904 F.2d 378, 381 (6th Cir. 1990) (concluding that
media companies owe no duty to "mentally fragile" youths, even if they marketed
their products to individuals with psychological conditions); Wilson v. Midway
Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 179-83 (D. Conn. 2002) (holding manufacturer of
violent video game immune to liability even if its product, marketed exclusively to
children, influenced minor assailant to stab decedent friend); Davidson v. Time
Warner, Inc., No. CIV.A. V-94-006, 1997 WL 405907, at *13-14 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31,
1997) (rejecting the claim that violent music influenced murderer's behavior and
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many legal commentators have argued for an expansion of the
law.3 This Note examines the circumstances under which media
corporations may be civilly liable for the violent content of their
youth-oriented products. Specifically, this Note will examine
negligence suits and First Amendment protections.
It will
explore whether the expansion of the law, such as presumption
of a causal link between media violence and aggressive behavior
in children, is necessary. It will also look at whether the health
and safety of children is a compelling interest that mitigates
First Amendment protections. Finally, this Note will consider
whether retaining current law is preferable absent scientific
proof that media violence leads to aggressive behavior in
children.
This Note suggests that courts in media-violence suits have
not considered the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc. 4 and that, despite scientific
uncertainty regarding causal links between media violence and
aggressive behavior in children, Daubert is not an absolute bar
to expert testimony. Finally, this Note proposes that the health
and safety of children is a compelling interest that should limit
media companies' First Amendment freedom to market violent
products to adolescents for pecuniary gain.

holding record company and musician immune to liability); Zamora v. CBS, Inc.,
480 F. Supp 199, 202-03 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (dismissing minor plaintiffs claim that he
became addicted to television violence, which allegedly desensitized plaintiff to real
life violence); McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 197-98 (Dist. Ct. App.
1988) (holding media company and musician immune to liability after distressed
teenager, while lying in bed listening to defendants' product chronicle death and
despair, committed suicide); Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d
1067, 1070-72 (Mass. 1989) (affirming dismissal of wrongful death suit because
producer of violent motion picture owed no duty to third-parties injured as a result
of consumer's violent behavior after viewing defendant's product).
3 See 145 CONG. REC. S5394, 5404-08 (daily ed. May 17, 1999) (statement of
Sen. Sessions) (concurring with other senators, both conservative and liberal, that
America must change the "culture of violence" targeted to children through media
products). See generally Lisa Kimmel, Media Violence: Different Times Call for
Different Measures, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 687 (2002) (addressing the extent to
which media violence targets young people and possible legal remedies for aggrieved
parties); David C. Kiernan, Note, Shall the Sins of the Son Be Visited Upon the
Father? Video Game Manufacturer Liability for Violent Video Games, 52 HASTINGS
L.J. 207 (2000-01) (arguing that plaintiffs should be permitted to bring tort claims
against manufacturers and producers of violent media products marketed to
children).
4 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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I. CAN VIOLENT MEDIA PRODUCTS LEAD TO VIOLENT
BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN?

Negligence claims hinge on whether plaintiffs can prove that
media violence leads to violent behavior in children. 5 Since the
early 1960s, some scientists have argued that such a causal
connection exists. 6 Repetition of clinical and empirical studies
cited by legal scholars continues to substantiate the hypothesis
that media violence, including television, video games, and
music, leads to aggressive behavior in children. 7 Thus, there is
5 These types of negligence suits have been largely unsuccessful. See, e.g.,
Watters, 904 F.2d at 384; Wilson, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 182-83; Sanders v. Acclaim
Entm't, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1281 (D. Colo. 2002); Zamora, 480 F. Supp. at
201-03; McCollum, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 193-94; Yakubowicz, 536 N.E.2d at 1072. But
see Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233, 251-52, 266-67 (4th Cir. 1997) (reversing
summary judgment and remanding wrongful death suit because genuine issues of
material fact existed with respect to book's influence on novice hit man and because
the district court erroneously concluded that the First Amendment barred suit);
Clift v. Narragansett Television, L.P., 688 A.2d 805, 809-11 (R.I. 1996) (reversing
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant television station
because factual questions existed as to whether defendant's broadcast was a "but
for" cause of decedent's suicide). Courts have rejected strict products liability of
media goods. See Watters, 904 F.2d at 381 ("[T]he doctrine of strict liability has
never been extended to words or pictures."); Wilson, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 171-74
(rejecting argument that interactive nature of video game rendered it a product
with respect to strict products liability); Sanders, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1277-79
(concluding that video games and movies were not products within the meaning of
strict products liability); James v. Meow Media, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 798, 811 (W.D:
Ky. 2000) (concluding that "intangible thoughts, ideas, and expressive content are
not 'products' within the realm of the strict [products] liability doctrine"); Herceg v.
Hustler Magazine Inc., 565 F. Supp. 802, 803 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (stating that "no
court ... has held that the content of a magazine or other publication is a product
within the meaning of [strict products liability]"); Beasock v. Dioguardi Enters., 130
Misc. 2d 25, 29-30, 494 N.Y.S.2d 974, 978 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1985) (concluding
that automotive publications were not subject to strict products liability doctrine).
6 See Linneman, supra note 1, at 191 (asserting that numerous studies show
media violence leads to aggressive behavior in children); see, e.g., Albert Bandura et
al., Transmission of Aggression Through Imitation of Aggressive Models, 63 J.
ABNORMAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 575, 576, 582 (1961); 0. Ivar Lovaas, Effect of Exposure
to Symbolic Aggression on Aggressive Behavor, 32 CHILD DEV. 37, 43-44 (1961).
See Fred Molitor & Kenneth William Hirsch, Children's Toleration of RealLife Aggression After Exposure to Media Violence: A Replication of the Drabman and
Thomas Studies, 24 CHILD STUDY J. 191, 202 (1994); Patricia L. Murphy, The
Commodified Self in Consumer Culture: A Cross-CulturalPerspective, 140 J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 636, 637 (2000); see also Sharon Begley, Why the Young Kill, NEWSWEEK,
May 3, 1999, at 32-34 (discussing the "biological roots of violence"). See generally
Craig A. Anderson & Brad J. Bushman, Effects of Violent Video Games on
Aggressive Behavior, Aggressive Cognition, Aggressive Affect, PhysiologicalArousal,
and Prosocial Behavior: A Meta-Analytic Review of the Scientific Literature, 12
PSYCHOL. SCI 353 (2001).
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scientific support that violent media products lead to violence
among children. Video games have received particular attention,
8
where evidence of such causal links is especially strong.
Nonetheless, some studies reach contrary results and
conclude that, absent preexisting psychological abnormalities,
media violence neither desensitizes children to real life violence
nor leads to violent behavior. 9 According to these studies, the
effects of motion pictures, 10 video games," or other media
products on children is negligible. 12
Thus, violent media
products pose no risk to child consumers.
Hypothesized links between media violence and violent
behavior in children remain speculative or, in the opinion of one
researcher, "pitifully underwhelming."'13 The issue continues to
generate debate within the scientific community, and a
consensus has yet to be reached. 14 Parents, religious groups, and
educators express concern that media violence may be unhealthy
for children.' 5
Furthermore, popular literature voices the
8 See Anderson & Bushman, supra note 7, at 353 (suggesting that "violent video
games increase aggressive behavior in children and young adults"). Some
researchers have further stated that media-influenced violence is inevitable and
that virtually all cotisumer goods affect human behavior. See, e.g., Murphy, supra
note 7, at 643-44 (finding that consumer goods significantly impact popular
attitudes); see also Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328-29 (7th
Cir. 1985) (discussing the impact of pornographic media products on consumers).
9 See, e.g., Michele J. Fleming & Debra J. Rickwood, Effects of Violent Versus
Nonviolent Video Games on Children's Arousal, Aggressive Mood, and Positive
Mood, 31 J. APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 2047, 2063-65 (2001); Jonathan L.
Freedman, Television Violence and Aggression: A Rejoinder, 100 PSYCHOL. BULL.
372, 377 (1986); Judith Van Evra, Finally Clapping with Two Hands: Looking at
Children's Talk About Television, 112 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 313, 314-15 (1999) (book
review); see also Bruce W. Sanford & Bruce D. Brown, Hit Man's Miss Hit, 27 N. KY.
L. REV. 69, 69-71 (2000).
10 See Van Evra, supra note 9 (concluding that violent television programs do
not desensitize children to real life violence).
11 See Fleming & Rickwood, supra note 9, at 2063-65 (finding that violent video
games do not lead to violent behavior in children).
12 See Freedman, supra note 9, at 372 (refuting the hypothesis that media
violence leads to real life violence).
13 Sanford & Brown, supra note 9, at 70.
14 See Letters to the Editor, Kids, TV Viewing, and Aggressive Behavior, 297
SCIENCE 49, 49-50 (July 5, 2002) (describing the ongoing disagreement among
scientists as to the effects of media violence on children).
15 See Linneman, supra note 1, at 163; David Trend, Merchants of Death: Media
Violence and American Empire, 73 HARV. EDUC. REV. 285, 290-91 (2003)
(explaining the influence parents and religious groups have on politicians in the
realm of media violence, as well as the activities of the National Parent Teachers
Association); National Alliance for Non-Violent Programming, at http://www.jack-
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concerns of many laypersons that media violence is a negative
16
influence on children.

II. MEDIA COMPANIES HAVE NOT BEEN HELD LIABLE FOR THE
VIOLENT CONTENT OF THEIR PRODUCTS

Although scientists are divided, courts have decided the
causation issue in favor of the media industry,1 7 and violent
media products have received broad First Amendment
protections.18 As a result, plaintiffs in media-violence suits are
nearly foreclosed from presenting a genuine issue of material
fact regarding causation because, even if the First Amendment
does not bar suit, courts have concluded that media violence
cannot, under virtually any circumstances, lead to violent
behavior in children.' 9 Therefore, media companies are held to
owe no duty to third parties injured by youths under the
influence of violent media products. 20 Furthermore, courts find
and-jill.orgINANP.htm (last updated Jan. 28, 2004) (calling for educators, parents,
religious groups, and others to join movement to rid the media of violent
programming).
16 See Begley, supra note 7, at 32-34 (documenting studies that suggest
exposure to violence can lead to aggressive behavior in children); Richard Corliss,
This Essay Is Rated PG-13, TIME, July 29, 2002, at 70 (expressing concerns about
media products targeted to children).
17 The media industry's interest in absolute protection from liability is intense.
In Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997), for example, defendant
Paladin's "astonishing stipulations" that it intended for its publication to assist
aspiring murderers did not dampen the media industry's enthusiasm to aid Paladin
in its defense of a wrongful death suit. Id. at 266-67. Over a dozen media companies
assisted Paladin as amici curiae, including America Online, ABC, The Washington
Post, and The New York Times. Id. at 235.
18 The First Amendment will be discussed infra Section III.
19 Absent a genuine issue of material fact, a complaint cannot withstand
summary judgment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
20 See Sanders v. Acclaim Entm't, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1275 (D. Colo.
2002) (holding that media defendants owed no duty to third-parties injured by
teenage consumers under the influence of defendants' violent media products);
Davidson v. Time Warner, Inc., No. CIV.A. V-94-006, 1997 WL 405907, at *13-14
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 1997) (concluding that musician and music company owed no
duty to third-persons regarding the violent content of their music product); Zamora
v. CBS, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 199, 201-03 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (deciding that media
company owed no duty to third-parties regarding violent television programming);
McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 195-97 (Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (media
company and musician owed no duty to suicide victim who shot himself while
listening to violent music product); Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536
N.E.2d 1067, 1070-72 (Mass. 1989) (affirming dismissal of wrongful death suit
because media company did not violate any duty toward third-parties in relation to
violent television programming).
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that aggressive behavior after exposure to violent media
products is an unforeseeable, superseding intervening cause of
21
injury.
Refusing to permit jurors to decide whether media violence
may have led to injury in a particular case is inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 22 In Daubert, the Court discussed the
judge's role as a gatekeeper with respect to the admissibility of
scientific evidence regarding causation. 23 Daubert requires a
trial judge rigorously 24 to evaluate scientific testimony 25 and
exclude testimony of questionable merit. 26 Although Daubert
requires trial judges to dismiss unqualified testimony, the
Supreme Court has also emphasized that judges need not do so
unnecessarily; 27 rather, the basic standard of admissibility is a
liberal one, 28 and courts should relax barriers to scientific
testimony when appropriate. 29 Therefore, scientific evidence
regarding causal relationships between media violence and
aggressive behavior in children does not need to be "'known' to a
certainty" 30 in order to be admissible. Despite these principles,
courts in media violence suits generally refuse to permit jurors to
hear scientific evidence regarding causation. 3 1 Although there
21 See Watters v. TSR, Inc., 904 F.2d 378, 380 (6th Cir. 1990) (concluding that
decedent's violent behavior was a superseding cause of his injury and that the
wrongful death suit against media defendant should be dismissed accordingly);
Sanders, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1276 (absolving media defendants of liability because
teenage gunmen's "intentional violent acts were [a] superseding cause of [injury]"
that absolved media defendants of liability).
22 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
23 See id. at 589-97. Specifically, plaintiffs in Daubert brought suit alleging
that defendant's pharmaceutical product "Bendectin" caused "serious birth defects"
in their children. Id. at 582. At issue was the admissibility of plaintiffs nonepidemiological based expert testimony, which allegedly refuted defendant's welldeveloped epidemiological evidence that Bendectin was safe. See id. at 583-85.
24 See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150-51 (1999) (interpreting
Daubert to require stringent standards).
25 See Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467, 473 (Wyo. 1999) (discussing the trial
judge's role to "[to] consider the soundness" of scientific testimony).
26 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315-16 (9th Cir.
1995) (stating that "something doesn't become 'scientific knowledge' just because it's
uttered by a scientist").
27 See Jamieson,984 P.2d at 472-73.
28 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
29 Id. at 588 (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
30 Id. at 590. The Court added that "arguably, there are no certainties in
science." Id.
31 See, e.g., James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 693 (6th Cir. 2002)
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may be "good science," 32 as opposed to "unsupported
speculation,"3 3 addressing causal links between exposure to
violence and aggressive behavior in children, and while ample
research exists to "assist [a] trier of fact to ... determine a
[causation] issue,"34 judges often dispose of media violence suits
in favor of defendants. 35
Voluminous published research
substantiating both sides of the causation debate should render
such testimony admissible in court.3 6 Media violence suits do not
seem to be an instance where only a "scintilla of evidence...
37
[renders the judge] free to direct a judgment."
(holding that it appears "impossible to predict" that video games, movies, and
internet sites would "incite a young person to violence"); Am. Amusement Mach.
Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 578-79 (7th Cir. 2001) (discrediting prior studies
as not evidence that violent video games are any more harmful than other forms of
entertainment).
32 Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n, 244 F.3d at 593. The Court stated that "[a]
pertinent consideration [regarding whether scientific evidence is admissible] is
whether the theory... has been subjected to peer review and publication." Id. The
absence of peer review and publication, however, does not necessarily bar
testimony. See id. at 594.
33 Id. at 599.
34 Id. at 592.
35 See, e.g., Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n, 244 F.3d at 580; Wilson v. Midway
Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 169 (D. Conn. 2002); Sanders v. Acclaim Entm't,
Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1281-82 (D. Colo. 2002); Torries v. Hebert, 111 F. Supp.
2d 806, 810, 824 (W.D. La. 2000); McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 188-89
(Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
36 See, e.g., Committee on Communications, American Academy of Pediatrics,
Media Violence, 95 PEDIATRICS 949, 949-51 (1995) (exploring the affects of media
violence on children); Joanne Cantor, Media Violence, 27 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH
30, 31-32 (2000) (concluding that media violence contributes to "violent and hostile
behavior"); Rafael Art. Javier et al., Violence and the Media: A Psychological

Analysis, 25 INT'L J. INSTRUCTIONAL MEDIA 339, 341-42, 351 (1998) (examining the

relationship between violence and the media in the context of individual psychology
and changes in society); Michael Craig Miller, Does Violence in the Media Cause
Violent Behavior?, HARV. MENTAL HEALTH LETTER, Sept. 2001, at 5 (documenting

research results of study to determine to what extent media violence changes
feelings or behavior); Mary Muscari, Media Violence: Advice for Parents, 28
PEDIATRIC NURSING 585, 585-86 (2002) (noting that more than 3,500 studies about
the negative effects of media violence on children have been conducted); Stephanie
Stapleton, Media Violence is Harmful to Kids-and to Public Health, AM. MED.
NEWS, Aug. 14, 2000, at 33 (" The link between media violence and real-life violence
has been made by science time and again.'" (quoting J. Edward Hall)).
37 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (2003).
Furthermore, jury input has been long cherished and encouraged by the judiciary.
See Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 502-03 (1980) (emphasizing the
importance of "the practical wisdom of the jury"); Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit
Union, 262 F.3d 70, 78 (1st Cir. 2001) (explaining that "[c]ourts traditionally defer
to the wisdom of juries in the resolution of fact-sensitive questions"); United States
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Specifically, Daubert declared a two-part test to determine
whether expert testimony is admissible evidence. 38
First,
testimony must be of requisite scientific merit. 39 Although the
Supreme Court provided no "definitive checklist or test,"40 judges
should weigh heavily whether testimony is grounded in scientific
method-based research subjected to peer review. 41 Another "very
significant" factor 42 is whether the testimony is based on
43
research funded and conducted "independent of the litigation."
The Court determined
that independent research provides
"objective proof' 44 of scientific merit, whereas research developed
45
expressly for judicial trials is usually unfit to be relied upon.
Thus, Daubert attempted to discourage "shopping"46 for expert
testimony.
47
Unlike the litigation in Daubert involving Bendectin,
researchers have been investigating the causal links between
media violence and aggressive behavior in children for decades,
v. Landau, 155 F.3d 93, 105 n.3 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[J]udge[s] should [defer to] the
findings of [a] jury, regardless of [their] own doubts in the matter." (quoting
CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

§

2806 (1995)));

United States v. Castillo, 148 F.3d 770, 775 (7th Cir. 1998) (refusing to "question
the wisdom of the jury[j"); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 752 (5th Cir.
1996) (emphasizing the importance of the "wisdom of... juries"); Clift v.
Narragansett Television L.P., 688 A.2d 805, 815 (R.I. 1996) (Flanders, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (stressing the importance of jury determination of
causation issues). Furthermore, some legal commentators argue that judges are not,
nor should they be, arbiters of scientific debate. KARL MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF

PUNISHMENT 132-39 (1968) (using the insanity defense to illustrate the importance
of jury determination of cause-in-fact issues surrounded by scientific debate).
Factual questions are usually best left to juries to resolve with the aid of expert
witnesses. Id.
38 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995).
39 Id. at 1316-17.
40 Id. at 1316.
41 Id. at 1316-17.
42 Id. at 1317.
43 Id.
44 Id.

45 See id. at 1317-19.
46

Id. at 1317.

47 Plaintiffs' witnesses in Daubert were all "experts in their respective fields,

[but] none claim[ed] to have [specifically] studied the effect of Bendectin . . . before
being hired to testify." Id. The causal link problems in Bendectin litigation stemmed
from the plaintiff's burden of proving under California law that the drug "more than
doubled" the risk of birth defects. Id. at 1320. Plaintiffs experts "were...
unprepared to testify that Bendectin caused plaintiffs' injuries; they were willing to
testify only that Bendectin is 'capable of causing' birth defects." Id. at 1321 (citation
omitted).
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independent of litigation. This research has endured extensive
peer review and has been published in scientific journals. 48
Therefore, expert testimony regarding media violence meets the
first prong of the Daubert test.
The second prong of the Daubert test requires a " 'fit'
between the testimony and an issue in the case," 49 in other
words, that expert testimony is based on research directly
relevant to the issue at trial. There is a "fit" between causal
issues in media violence suits and independent studies
concerning links between violent media products and aggressive
behavior in children. In fact, the legal issue is identical to the
51
scientific question. 50 There is a perfect "fit."
In Sanders v. Acclaim Entertainment, Inc., 52 plaintiffs
wrongful death suit alleged that defendants' violent media
products influenced teenage gunmen's destructive behavior. 53
The teenage gunmen, who killed thirteen and injured dozens,
were described by the court as "excessive consumers" of violent
video games and violent movies. 54 Nonetheless, the court,
without reference to scientific authority or to Daubert, granted
the media defendants' motion to dismiss. 55 The court failed to
cite a single scientific study yet concluded that defendants "had
no reason to suppose" violent media products could lead to
aggressive behavior in teenagers.5 6 The court stated that
"exposure to [violent] video games and ... movie[s]" could not
lead to violent behavior in children 57 and "no reasonable jury
could find [otherwise]." 5 8 The district judge relied solely on his

48

See supra note 36 and accompanying text.

49 Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1320.
50 See Testimony Report on Violence in the Media and Children: HearingBefore

the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transportation, 106th Cong. (2000)
(testimony of Dr. Donald Cook, President, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics); see also supra
note 36 and accompanying text.
51 On the other hand, plaintiffs in Daubert relied on "circumstantial proof of
causation" rather than studies that directly addressed the issue at suit. Daubert, 43
F.3d at 1320.
52 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (D. Colo. 2002).
53 Id. at 1268.
54 Id. Additionally, the killers' strategy and behavior apparently replicated the
events of one such movie. See id.
55 See id. at 1270-76.
56 Id. at 1272.

57 Id. at 1272-73.
58

Id. at 1264.
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"common sense" 59 and ruled that violent media products cannot
affect children's behavior, and even if such products could lead to
violent behavior in child consumers, the relationship was too
attenuated to lead to liability.60 The Daubert Court provided
guidelines for determining the merit and admissibility of
scientific evidence: One person's "common sense" is insufficient
61
to block plaintiffs expert testimony and dismiss the suit.
In Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc.,62 plaintiff alleged that
defendant manufacturer's violent interactive video game was a
but for cause of decedent's murder. 63 Specifically, plaintiff
alleged that defendant's product spurred "killer responses"
among players. 6 4 Plaintiff also emphasized the complexity and
"futuristic technology" of today's video games and argued that
their ability to influence players and consume their attention is
unprecedented. 65 Plaintiff alleged that the murderer, a child of
unspecified age, became "addicted" 66 to defendant's video game
and stabbed the decedent in a manner akin to that seen in the
game. 67 The court's reference to scientific authority was limited
to a single footnote in which the court recognized, but declined to
evaluate, scientific research regarding the effects of media
violence on children. 68 The court rejected plaintiffs causal
allegations and granted defendant's motion to dismiss without
mention of Daubert.69 Thus, plaintiff was foreclosed from
59 Id. at 1271-72 (quoting Perreira v. Colorado, 768 P.2d 1198, 1209 (Colo.

1989)).
60
61

See id. at 1276.
In any event, the Supreme Court has stated that the judiciary may be the

"group in the country [least] qualified . . . to have any considered judgment as to
what the deleterious or beneficial impact of a particular [media product] may be on
minds either young or old." Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 656 (1968)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
62 198 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D. Conn. 2002).
63 Id. at 169-70.
64

Id.

Id. at 170.
Id. at 169.
67 Id. at 170. The child killer stabbed decedent in the chest with a knife in a
manner consistent with that of one of the video game's characters. Id.
68 See id. at 182 n.33. Such causal relationships were crucial to plaintiffs suit.
For example, plaintiff alleged that juvenile game players would eventually believe
that "violence [is] a viable problem-solving technique." Id. at 170. The court,
however, failed to include the work of the scientific community in its reasoning.
69 Id. at 169. In addition to rejecting plaintiffs causation claim, the court
grounded its decision in First Amendment jurisprudence. Id. See infra Section III
for a discussion of First Amendment issues.
65
66
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developing and presenting causal issues to jurors, or even to the
judge through a summary judgment motion.7 0 Instead, without
meaningful explanation, the court simply refused to entertain
71
plaintiffs allegations.
In Torries v. Hebert,72 the court granted injunctive relief in
favor of a proprietor whose business marketed violent music to
children.7 3 Specifically, after responding to a disturbance caused
by patrons at plaintiff Torries' skating rink, police seized
compact discs containing violent music that allegedly sparked
child patrons-who ranged in age from seven to sixteen-to
riot. 74 Although skating was the primary activity at Torries'
75
business, the "skating sessions.., centered around music."
Torries brought suit demanding the return of his compact
discs.7 6 The court rejected as "speculative" the defendants' claim
that violent music was a substantial factor that helped spark
aggressive behavior in children. 77 Rather than fully consider
both sides of the scientific debate, the court rejected defendants'
causal arguments and concluded that violent media products
78
cannot lead to aggressive behavior in children.
Similarly, in McCollum v. CBS, Inc.,79 a California court
dismissed the plaintiffs allegations that defendants' music
product influenced decedent teenager's suicide.8 0 Specifically, an
emotionally distressed teenager shot himself while lying in bed
listening to one of his favorite musicians chronicle despair,

70

71

Id.
See id. at 181-82.

111 F. Supp. 2d 806 (W.D. La. 2000).
73 Id. at 810-11.
72

74 Id.

75 Id. at 812.
76 Id. at 813.
77 See id. at 820.

Specifically, the court responded to statements by defendant's
witness whose specialization in the field of media violence was dubious given his
failure to support his statements with citation to even a single scientific authority.
Whatever the effectiveness of the defendant's witness, the court dismissed the
possibility of causal connections between media violence and aggressive behavior in
children without reference to a single authority countering the defendant's
testimony. See id.
78 Id.

249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
Id. at 188-89. Plaintiff alleged that defendant targeted troubled adolescents
and encouraged their self-destructive behavior. See id. at 189-90. The court favored
defendants' argument, which, among other things, likened defendants' music to
"Hamlet's 'to be or not to be' soliloquy." Id. at 190 n.4.
79
80
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violence, and death.8 1 Decedent's stereo was running at the time
of his suicide.8 2 Without citing scientific authority, the court
concluded that media products cannot significantly affect
teenage listeners and "[n]o rational person would or could...
83
mistake musical lyrics ... for literal commands or directives."
The court added that this was particularly so when music was
recorded and thus "remote from the listener.8 s4 Despite the
ongoing scientific debate, the court ruled that "there [was] no
room for a reasonable difference of opinion," 85 and similar to
Sanders, the judge relied on his "common sense"8 6 and dismissed
the plaintiffs suit.
In American Amusement Machine Ass'n v. Kendrick,8 7 the
Seventh Circuit agreed with plaintiff trade association that
violent video games cannot lead to aggressive behavior in
children and held a local ordinance that sought to shield minors
from violent video games unconstitutional.88
The court
recognized the importance of scientific evidence to its
determination and thus proceeded to decide "whether ...violent
video games cause harm either to the game players or. . . the
public at large."8 9 Although the court acknowledged both sides of
the scientific debate, 90 it nonetheless concluded, in part based on
"[c]ommon sense,"91 that media violence cannot manifest itself
into actual violent behavior in children. 92 The court of appeals
reversed the lower court and concluded that "harm... from
[violent video] games is implausible, [and] at best wildly
speculative." 93 The Kendrick decision essentially vetoed the
ordinance and found that researchers who supported the
possibility of causal links between media violence and aggressive

81

See id. at 189.

Id.
Id. at 194. The opinion did not indicate whether plaintiff cited scientific
authority to support his causal hypotheses.
84 Id. at 194 n.10.
85 Id. at 196 (citation omitted).
86 Id. at 194.
87 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
88 Id. at 578-80. The court, however, did not foreclose the possibility that a
similarly worded ordinance could be constitutional. See id. at 579.
89 Id. at 576.
90 See id. at 574, 578-79.
91 Id. at 579.
92 See id. at 578-79.
93 Id. at 579.
82
83
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behavior in children-approximately
half the scientific
community-were mistaken. 94 To the contrary, the court stated
that the absence of media violence would be unhealthy for
children because they would be "raised in an intellectual
95
bubble."
Perhaps the correct holding came from the district court in
Kendrick.96
There, the court stated that "definitive proof
from ... scien[tific] research that ... [violent] video games...
causen harmful aggressive behavior [in children]" was not a
prerequisite to render the ordinance constitutional and thereby
upheld the ordinance. 9 7 Despite "uncertainty" 98 within the
scientific community, the court concluded that links between
media violence and aggressive behavior in children were "solidly
reasonable" beliefs. 99 In contrast to the circuit court's view, that
media violence can be beneficial to child development, the
district court viewed violent video games as little more than "a
complete learning environment for aggression" nearly devoid of
social utility.100

III. FIRST

AMENDMENT CONCERNS

The media industry maintains that any step towards
holding media corporations civilly liable for the violent content of
their child-entertainment products would chill freedom of

94 See id. at 578-79.

95 Id. at 577.
96 115 F. Supp. 2d 943 (S.D. Ind. 2000), reu'd, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
97 Id. at 960.

Id. at 959.
99 Id. at 963.
98

100Id. at 964 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). Consistent with this

view, government officials, and the citizenry whom they represent, should consider
whether the burden of proof in media violence suits should be placed on defendants.

Common law public policy-based rules shifting the burden of proof to defendants in
negligence cases is not uncommon. The decision hinges on whether to afford greater
protection to business interests, or the interest of our youth. See Ybarra v.
Spangard, 154 P.2d 687, 690 (Cal. 1944) (stating that it would be "manifestly
unreasonable" to place the burden of proof on plaintiff appendectomy patient, and
that "plaintiff [need] not identif[y] the instrumentality" that caused his injury);
Gilbert v. Korvette, Inc., 327 A.2d 94, 103 (Pa. 1974) (holding defendants escalator
manufacturer and retail store liable absent proof that they were not negligent);
Loch v. Confair, 93 A.2d 451, 453-54 (Pa. 1953) (concluding in personal injury case
that "reason and justice alike" required the burden of proof be placed on defendants,
in part because they could best explain techniques employed to ensure consumer
safety).
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expression. 1 1 Courts generally agree with the media industry
on this point. 102
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make
no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. 10 3
Although its plain meaning mandates that speech enjoy legal
protection, regulation of speech is not always precluded by the
First Amendment; for example, the First Amendment "would not
'10 4
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre.

101See Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233, 265 (4th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he major
networks, newspapers, and publishers, contend that any decision recognizing even
a potential cause of action [in a media violence suit] ... will have far-reaching
chilling effects on the rights of free speech and press."). Specifically, media
companies argue that media violence suits "'will disturb decades of First
Amendment jurisprudence and jeopardize free speech from the periphery to the
core.... No expression-music, video, books, even newspaper articles-would be
safe from civil liability.'" Id. (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae Washington Post, Inc.,
at 3). The Paladin court, however, rejected, with impunity, the media industry's
"breathtaking' argument that Paladin may "intentionally and knowingly assist
murderers with technical information." Id.
102 Although there have been scant exceptions, such as Paladin, 128 F.3d at
251-52 (rejecting media defendants' First Amendment arguments and remanding
case for further proceedings) and Clift v. Narragansett Television, L.P., 688 A.2d
805, 817 (R.I. 1996) (Flanders, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(asserting that the First Amendment is not a "wall of immunity protecting the
media from any liability" (citing Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995-96 (2d Cir.
1973))), most courts have sided with the media industry and granted almost
absolute First Amendment protections to defendants in media violence suits. See
Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 578 (7th Cir. 2001)
(comparing a child's right to play graphically violent video games with the child's
right to read violent classic literature); Watters v. TSR, Inc., 904 F.2d 378, 382 (6th
Cir. 1990); Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 179-81 (D. Conn.
2002) (stating that video games enjoy First Amendment protection); Sanders v.
Acclaim Entm't, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1279 (D. Colo. 2002) (concluding that
"video games deserve.., full First Amendment protection"); Zamora v. CBS, Inc.,
480 F. Supp. 199, 205 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (analogizing the press to violent television
programming, thereby justifying First Amendment protections); McCollum v. CBS,
Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 198 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that violent music,
even if consumed by "emotionally fragile" youth, is entitled to First Amendment
protection); Bill v. Superior Court, 187 Cal. Rptr. 625, 628-30, 634 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982) (dismissing plaintiffs complaint against producers of violent film, citing
First Amendment protections); Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536
N.E.2d 1067, 1071 (Mass. 1989) (concluding that a violent motion picture is entitled
to First Amendmant protection); see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273
F.3d 429, 446 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L.
REV. 73, 84-86 (1996) (arguing that the First Amendment extends to artistic
expression)).
103 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
104

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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Challenges to First Amendment protections often result
from either obscene or violent material. 10 5 Courts have been
more willing to place restrictions on obscenity than on
violence. 10 6 Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire10 7 "laid the
foundation" for restrictions on obscene material. 0 8 Later, the

105 See Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 574 (stating that "[v]iolence and obscenity are
[two] distinct categories of [unprotected speech]" (citing Winters v. New York, 333
U.S. 507, 518-20 (1948))); Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County,
200 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1135-36 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (distinguishing between violence
and obscenity, both of which are not fully protected by the First Amendment); In re
Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. MDL
150 AWI, 1992 WL 133093, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 1992) (explaining that the First
Amendment does not extend to obscenity or material "likely to incite ... immediate
and serious violence"); Eckford-El v. Toombs, 760 F. Supp. 1267, 1270 (W.D. Mich.
1991) (explaining that material which is neither obscene nor meant to incite
violence falls within the First Amendment, but material outside those parameters is
unprotected); Mabey v. Reagan, 376 F. Supp. 216, 222 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (concluding
that "caustic dialogue" was protected by the First Amendment because "[a]t no
time... did plaintiff use profane or obscene language and apparently [did not]
incite violence"); Byers v. Edmondson, 712 So. 2d 681, 689 (La. Ct. App. 1998)
(asserting that "speech which is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action, and which is likely to incite or produce such action" is not protected by the
First Amendment (citing McCollum, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 193)). Other exceptions to
First Amendment protections include 'libel, slander, misrepresentation .... perjury,
false advertising, solicitation of crime, complicity by encouragement, conspiracy....
speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal
statute." Id.
106 Courts have a long history of restricting obscene material in order to benefit
children. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 754-55 (1982) (chronicling the
judiciary's obscenity jurisprudence); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973)
(stating that "obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment" (citations
omitted)); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("[I]mplicit in the history
of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming
social importance."); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)
(upholding a criminal statute that imposed penalties for obscene speech and stating
that "the lewd and obscene" are not protected by the First Amendment). Media
violence, on the other hand, has been granted First Amendment protections. See
Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 578 (extending First Amendment protections to video games);
Wilson, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 179-81 (stating that video games enjoy First Amendment
protection); Sanders, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1279 ("[V]ideo games deserve.., full First
Amendment protection."); Zamora, 480 F. Supp. at 205 (stating that violent
television programming enjoys First Amendment protections); Yakubowicz, 536
N.E.2d at 1071 (concluding that violent movies are entitled to First Amendment
protections).
107 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
108 See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 754 ("In Chaplinsky... the Court laid the
foundation for the excision of obscenity from the realm of constitutionally protected
expression.").
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Supreme Court stated that "obscenity is not within the area of
constitutionally protected speech." 109
The Court expanded its obscenity jurisprudence in later
decisions; for example, in Osborne v. Ohio, 10 the Supreme Court
upheld a statutory ban on child pornography."1
The Court
recognized that the social utility of child pornography was
"exceedingly modest" 112 and that the "[s]tate's interest in
'safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a
minor' is 'compelling.' "113 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has
"repeatedly held that the protection of the First Amendment
4
does not extend to obscene speech.""1
Even non-obscene, constitutionally protected indecent
speech may be regulated in order to "protect[] the physical and
psychological well-being of minors." 115 In Sable Communications
of California,Inc. v. FCC,116 the Court stated that "[g]overnment
may... regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech
in order to promote a compelling interest," such as the health
and safety of children. 1 7 Although Sable was couched in legal
terms, the opinion was really a value judgment grounded in
cultural considerations. Indeed, cultural considerations have
1 18
guided much of the Court's obscenity jurisprudence.
119
In Reno v. ACLU, the Court affirmed the "legitimacy and
importance of ... protecting children from harmful materials"
although the Court invalidated a statute enacted to protect
children from obscene and indecent material on the internet
because of "wholly unprecedented"'' 20 statutory vagueness and
109 Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.

110 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
111 Id.
at 125-26 (finding defendant's "First Amendment arguments
unpersuasive" and upholding the constitutionality of an anti-obscenity statute).
112 Id.
at 108 ("[Tjhe value of permitting child pornography has been
characterized as 'exceedingly modest, if not de minimis.'" (quoting Ferber,458 U.S.

at 762 )).
113 Id. at
114 Sable
115 Id. at

109 (quoting Ferber,458 U.S. at 756-57).
Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124 (1989).
126 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968)); see
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-57 (commenting on the need to foster healthy psychological
development of children).
116 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
117 Id. at 126.
118 Id. at 131 (Scalia, J., concurring) (recognizing that "value judgment[s]" guide
the Court in decisions regarding indecent speech).
119 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
120

Id. at 877.
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breadth. 121 The Court also distinguished the "invasive"'122 nature
of television and radio from the internet; the latter requires
"sophistication and ... ability to ... retrieve [sexually obscene]
material;"1 23 whereas, violent media products on television and
radio are accessed by "merely turning a dial."' 24 Finally, the
Court noted that, unlike sexually explicit internet pages
marketed to adults, targeting children for pecuniary gain limits
First Amendment protection. 125
Thus, the Court has permitted regulation of speech when
children are at risk 126 and has granted regulatory "leeway"' 27 in
order to ensure that children live in a healthy environment.
Recognizing that "[a] democratic society rests ... upon the
healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity
as citizens,"' 28 it seems that holding manufacturers accountable
for the harmful effects of their products does not offend First
Amendment principles.
This is especially so when media
products lack any "literary, artistic, scientific, or educational
value."' 29
The interest of children "justifie[s] special
treatment;"' 30 thus, the Supreme Court has granted broad
protections for children against obscene or indecent speech.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSCENITY JURISPRUDENCE HAS NOT
EXTENDED TO MEDIA VIOLENCE

Media violence cases have not paralleled courts' distaste for
obscenity. 131 Although regulation of violent media products
would often affect "the form, rather than the content, of serious
121
122
123

Id. at 849.
Id. at 869.
Id. at 854.

124

Id.

See id. at 865.
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982) (asserting that a stable
society requires a positive environment in which children can develop into healthy
adults (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944))). The Ferber Court
added that "[aiccordingly, we have sustained legislation aimed at protecting the
physical and emotional well-being of youth even when the laws have operated in the
sensitive area of constitutionally protected rights." Id. at 757.
127 Id. at 756.
128 Id. at 757 (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 168).
129 Id. at 777.
130 Id. at 757 (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978)).
131 See Dalal, supra note 1, at 358-60 (discussing media companies' immunity
from liability for the violent content of their child-entertainment products, and
attempts to change the status quo).
125
126

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.78:427

communication,"' 132 courts have nonetheless refused to burden
133
media companies' freedom to market violent products.
It seems inconsistent that courts have taken such a
vehement stance against obscenity, yet they grant media
companies almost complete freedom to market violence to
children. In fact, despite studies to the contrary, some judges
believe that less media violence would be "deforming"'1 34 and
leave children "unequipped to cope with the world as we know
it."135 Thus far, the judiciary has not explained the apparent
incongruity between obscenity and media violence jurisprudence.
Although opinion cannot be regulated under the First
Amendment merely because it "gives offense"' 36 or is
"disagreeable,"'137 certain youth-oriented violent media products
may lack any message or opinion whatsoever. 138 Such products
132 PacificaFound., 438 U.S. at 743 n. 18.
133 See, e.g., Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 576-77
(7th Cir. 2001) (comparing a child's right to play graphically violent video games
with the child's right to read violent classic literature); Watters v. TSR, Inc., 904
F.2d 378, 381 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that video game manufacturer is not
responsible for determining the mental state of every potential buyer of the
manufacturer's video games); Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167,
181 (D. Conn. 2002) (holding that the content of the defendant's video game was
protected by the First Amendment); Sanders v. Acclaim Entm't, Inc., 188 F. Supp.
2d 1264, 1275 (D. Colo. 2002) (holding that video game manufacturers do not have a
duty of care to anticipate or prevent any violent acts committed by individuals who
play video games); Davidson v. Time Warner, Inc., No. CIV.A. V-94-006, 1997 WL
405907, at *17 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 1997) (stating that the violent lyrics of the
defendant's album are constitutionally protected); Zamora v. CBS, Inc., 480 F. Supp.
199, 205-06 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (noting that the public has a right to access the ideas
disseminated by the media); Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d
1067, 1071 (Mass. 1989) (holding that defendant had a constitutional right to create
and show a violent movie); McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 191-92 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the defendant has a First Amendment right to produce
a song with violent lyrics).
134 Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 577.
135 Id. Although the scientific community is divided over whether media
violence leads to violent behavior in children, no researcher has ever suggested that
media violence is healthy or beneficial.
136 Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 745; see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
404-05 (1989) (documenting the broad protections granted by the First
Amendment); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[T]he First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.").
137 Torries v. Hebert, 111 F. Supp. 2d 806, 818 (W.D. La. 2000) (quoting
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414).
138 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 446 (2d Cir. 2001)
(" 'Speech' is an elusive term, and judges and scholars have debated its bounds for
two centuries."); see also Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
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seem unintended to contribute to a "marketplace of ideas"139 and,
instead, simply release gratuitous violence for the shock value it
has on adolescents and the pecuniary gain it generates. 140
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
for example, declined to distinguish media violence from classic
literature.
In American Amusement Machine Ass'n v.
Kendrick,141 the court reversed the district court and ruled in
favor of plaintiffs who challenged an anti-media violence
ordinance. 142 The court was unable to distinguish violent video
games from classic literature such as The Odyssey, The Divine
143
Comedy, War and Peace, and the works of Edgar Allen Poe.
This Note asserts that today's violent entertainment cannot
be compared with classic literary works containing violence.
There is a crucial difference between insightful, albeit sometimes
violent, speech about the virtues and/or frailties of the human
persona and, on the other end of the intellectual spectrum,
violent entertainment geared toward children.
The district court in Kendrick,144 for example, would treat
"[g]raphic violence" directed toward children as a form of
obscenity. 145 Specifically, the court concluded that graphic
violence was a "variable obscenity"-material constitutionally
protected when distributed to adults, but unprotected in the
hands of children. 46 Thus, the district court held that graphic
violence enjoys no more First Amendment protection than

Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971) (suggesting the First Amendment
should pertain only to political speech). Arguably, in light of media company
censorship, perhaps the proper inquiry is not whether regulation is permissible
under the First Amendment; rather the proper inquiry may be whether the First
Amendment protects the marketplace of ideas.
139Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990) (citing Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)); see also New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (noting that the First Amendment is
intended "'to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people."' (quoting Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957))).
140 See Corliss, supra note 16, at 70 (commenting on the use of "[c]rude humor
and violence" in films marketed to child audiences in order to get children's
"disposable income" needed to pay "pricey" media industry salaries).
141 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
142 Id. at 577-78.
143 Id. at 577.
144 115 F. Supp. 2d 943 (S.D. Ind. 2000), rev'd, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
145 Id. at 967.
146 See id. at 955.
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sexually explicit material. 147 Furthermore, although some video
games enjoy First Amendment protection, 148 the district court
held that the health and safety of children is a compelling
governmental interest that permits regulation of media violence,
149
even "in the face of inconclusive social science evidence.'
The Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment to
protect literary, artistic, political, and scientific thought. 15 0 In
the framers' words, the First Amendment targets the
"advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in general."'15
Many violent youth-oriented media products do not advance
these constitutional objectives. Instead, as the district court
stated in Kendrick, media violence in the hands of children is no
more beneficial to young people or society than obscene sexual
materia' 52 and may lack ideas or other content protected by the
153
First Amendment when in the hands of children.
Courts must decide whether the effects of media violence on
children justify regulation. 54 Although violent media products
may be protected in other contexts, 155 exploitation of children for
financial gain compels greater scrutiny. 56 There is a difference
between regulating violent products targeted to children and
unconstitutional regulation of the adult marketplace.' 5 7 Because
of a state's compelling interest in protecting the health and

See id. at 971.
Id. at 952.
149 Id. at 972.
150 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 446 (2d Cir. 2001) ("The
First Amendment protects works which, taken as a whole, have serious literary,
(alteration in original) (quoting Miller v.
artistic, political, or scientific value ....
California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973))).
151 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 108 (1774); see also Corley,
273 F.3d at 446. (quoting 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 108 (1774)).
152 Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 971.
153 See id. at 958.
154 United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950) (stating that
147
148

courts must decide "whether the gravity of the 'evil'

...

justifies ... invasion of free

speech [in order] to avoid the danger").
155 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 868 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (citing FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978)).
156 See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244F.3d 572, 575 (7th Cir.
2001) ("Protecting people from violence is at least as hallowed a role for government
as protecting people from [obscenity].").
157 See Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 74-75, 218 N.E.2d 668, 671,
271 N.Y.S.2d 947, 951 (1996) (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964)).
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safety of children, violent media goods should not enjoy absolute
158
First Amendment protection.
The question still remains as to whether there should be a
constitutional privilege for media companies to recklessly or
negligently market violent products to children. Additionally, it
is unclear whether such an approach would equate First
Amendment free expression protections with "commercial
exploitation [and] demean[]the grand conception of the First
Amendment and its high purposes in the historic struggle for
freedom." 159 These issues have yet to be resolved and courts
should not foreclose debate intended to address difficult First
Amendment questions presented by media violence targeted to
children.
CONCLUSION

Despite increasing concern over the effects of media violence
on child consumers, courts have almost foreclosed the possibility
of media company liability for the violent content of their childentertainment products. Judges, inconsistent with Supreme
Court precedent, generally refuse to permit juries to hear causein-fact issues in media violence suits. Similarly, courts in media
violence suits have applied a First Amendment jurisprudence
that is tangential to mainstream judicial thinking and graciously
overprotective of the media industry. The accountability of
media corporations for the violent content of their child158

Id.

159Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973). Additionally, it seems that
media companies do not freely promote ideas; instead, they scrutinize and restrict
speech and may market only that which most effectively leads to sales. See Corliss,
supra note 16, at 70 (commenting on the media industry's emphasis on sales).
Furthermore, although there seems to be little primary or secondary material
directly addressing the matter, some children's media products, particularly music
industry products, seem to frequently portray African Americans as gun-wielding

protagonists. See Maureen Dowd, Perspective: The Man Who Would Be Mayor,
TIMES UNION (Albany), July 1, 2001, at B5 (citing New York City mayor Michael
Bloomberg's assessment that some music products are "racist"); see also Trevor
Fisher, Chuck D Testifies at Stephens, IOWA STATE DAILY, Feb. 6, 2002 (reporting
rapper's displeasure that "[iun today's hip-hop music," racial slurs in reference to
African Americans are commonplace) http://www.iowastatedaily.com/vnews/display.
v/ART/2002/02/06/3c6OceOOe7f9e?inarchive=l. It is worth bearing in mind that
although "[p]eople often act in accordance with the images and patterns they find
around them," such media images may encourage harmful stereotypes towards
African Americans. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328-29
(7th Cir. 1985); see also Dalal, supra note 1, at 374 n.113.
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entertainment products is a matter ripe for legislative or
Supreme Court review. Ultimately, the federal government
must choose whether to permit the status quo to continue
unabated or to adopt judicial endorsement of a culture that
rejects violence and cherishes the health and safety of children.
Hopefully, the public will compel the government to choose the
latter.

